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I. INTRODUCTION
In early 2006, the Supreme Court announced its decision in Central
Virginia Community College v. Katz' and once again changed the frame-
work for state sovereign immunity that has been evolving since early in
this country's history. In Katz, the Court held that some bankruptcy
actions involving state agencies are not barred by state sovereign immu-
nity.2  This was a landmark decision in the realm of state sovereign
immunity because the Court essentially turned its back on its Seminole
Tribe of Florida v. Florida decision from just ten years earlier.' In Sem-
inole Tribe, the Court held that Congress could not abrogate state sover-
eign immunity under the Indian Commerce Clause or any other Article I,
Section 8 power.' Moreover, the Court indicated that its holding applied
* J.D. candidate, 2008, University of Miami School of Law.
1. 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
2. Id. at 359.
3. Id. at 363 ("We acknowledge that statements in both the majority and the dissenting
opinions in [Seminole Tribe], reflected an assumption that the holding in that case would apply to
the Bankruptcy Clause. Careful study and reflection have convinced us, however, that that
assumption was erroneous.") (citations omitted).
4. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996).
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to bankruptcy, antitrust, and copyright suits.5 While sticking to its hold-
ing for suits implicating the Patent Clause,6 the Court, in Katz, found
that the Bankruptcy Clause somehow differs from the other Article I,
Section 8 legislative powers.7
The history of state sovereign immunity shows that the doctrine is
complicated and ever-evolving. In the process of trying to develop a
coherent doctrine, the Court has looked to many sources, including the
Tenth Amendment, the Eleventh Amendment, the Constitution as a
whole, and the framework of understanding under which all of these
texts were written. With each new case, the Court seems to consider a
slightly different set of factors to guide its decision. Katz is just the
latest in a long series of cases that may illuminate or complicate the state
sovereign-immunity doctrine.
This Article attempts to determine the soundness of the Katz hold-
ing by analyzing the history of state sovereign immunity and the recent
Katz opinion. It also attempts to show that Seminole Tribe and Katz
cannot co-exist. Part I gives a brief history of the Supreme Court cases
through which state sovereign-immunity jurisprudence developed:
Chisholm v. Georgia,8 Hans v. Louisiana,9 Alden v. Maine,1" and Fed-
eral Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Authority.l"
Part III examines three crucial recent cases to this state sovereign-immu-
nity analysis: Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida,2 Tennessee Student
Assistance Corp. v. Hood, 3 and Central Virginia Community College v.
Katz. 4 Part IV examines the foundations of the state sovereign-immu-
nity doctrine from the perspective of English law and the U.S. Constitu-
tion. Part V details the history of the Bankruptcy Clause, and looks for
clues as to the Framers' intent. It then compares bankruptcy law with
both patent law and with the Patent Clause to see whether bankruptcy
really should qualify as an exception to the Court's sovereign-immunity
doctrine.
The most pressing question in this analysis is whether bankruptcy
5. Id. at 72 n.16 ("It has not been widely thought that the federal antitrust, bankruptcy, or
copyright states abrogated the States' immunity.").
6. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636
(stating that Seminole Tribe makes it clear that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign
immunity under the Patent Clause).
7. Katz, 546 U.S. at 362-63.
8. 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419 (1793).
9. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
10. 527 U.S. 706 (1999).
11. 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
12. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
13. 541 U.S. 440 (2004).
14. 546 U.S. 356 (2006).
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is so different from other Article I powers that the Court had to make an
exception to an already complicated doctrine. If bankruptcy is different
and if the Katz opinion is well reasoned, then the result may stand. This
result, however, means the downfall of the Court's seminal state sover-
eign-immunity decision-Seminole Tribe. This also means that courts
must completely re-think the nexus between Article I and state sovereign
immunity.
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY IN
THE UNITED STATES
A. Chisholm v. Georgia
Any historical account of the state sovereign-immunity doctrine
starts in 1793 with the Court's first major state sovereign-immunity
decision, Chisholm v. Georgia."5 In a 4-1 decision, the Supreme Court
allowed a citizen of South Carolina to sue the State of Georgia and
recover a money judgment.16 The Court relied on Article III, Section 2
of the Constitution to support its holding. 7 The relevant part of that
clause states that "[t]he judicial power [of the United States] shall extend
•.. to controversies.., between a State and Citizens of another state."1 8
The Court did not interpret this expression of federal jurisdiction as lim-
ited to cases where the State was the plaintiff, asking:
[W]hat shall we do with the immediate preceding clause; 'controver-
sies between two or more States,' where a State must of necessity be
Defendant? If it was not the intent, in the very next clause also, that a
State might be made Defendant, why was it so expressed as naturally
to lead to and comprehend that idea? Why was not an exception made
if one was intended?19
So, just over five years after ratification of the Constitution, the
Supreme Court interpreted the federal judicial power as abrogating state
sovereign immunity. The States, however, were outraged with the hold-
ing in Chisholm. The States believed that they were entitled to the same
sovereign immunity that they enjoyed before ratification. 20 Less than
15. 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) 419 (1793).
16. Id. at 452-53, 466, 469, 479.
17. Id. at 466.
18. U.S. CONST. art. Il, § 2, cl. 1.
19. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 DalI.) at 467 (Cushing, J., concurring).
20. See Richard Lieb, State Sovereign Immunity: Bankruptcy Is Special, 14 AM. BANKR. INST.
L. REV. 201, 215-16 (2006). The States were afraid of an onslaught of lawsuits by citizens to
recover debts incurred during the Revolutionary War. See id. The fact that the States responded
so quickly and adamantly to Chisholm seems to indicate a clear consensus on state sovereign
immunity at the time of ratification. See id. at 216. Historical evidence, however, shows that this
was not the case. See infra Part III.
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two years later, the States ratified the Eleventh Amendment:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to
extend to any suit in law or equity, commenced or prosecuted against
one of the United States by Citizens of another state, or by Citizens or
Subjects of any Foreign State.2 '
This text is fairly specific in refuting the Court's decision in Chisholm,
but it does not go much further.22 As will be discussed, the Eleventh
Amendment does not fully explain the state sovereign-immunity doc-
trine as it exists today.
Justice Iredell wrote the lone dissent in Chisholm.23 He quoted
from Section 14 of the Judiciary Act of 1789:
All the before mentioned Courts of the United States, shall have
power to issue writs of scire facias, habeas corpus, and all other writs
not specially provided for by statute, which may be necessary for the
exercise of their respective jurisdictions, and agreeable to the princi-
ples and usages of law.
24
Justice Iredell determined that the "principles and usages of law" must
be derived from the common law of the several States.2 He further
argued that neither Georgia nor any other State in the Union, at the time
of ratification of the Constitution and at the time the Judiciary Act was
passed, authorized suits to recover money judgments against a State.26
As it turned out, the States agreed with Justice Iredell's interpretation of
state sovereign immunity.
B. Hans v. Louisiana
For nearly one hundred years following the Chisholm decision,
state sovereign immunity and the Eleventh Amendment were not seri-
ously questioned.27 Then, in 1890, the Court handed down its second
major state sovereign-immunity decision in Hans v. Louisiana.28 In
Hans, a citizen of Louisiana sued the State of Louisiana to collect inter-
est on a bond issued to him under a legislative act of that State.2 9 Rather
21. U.S. CONST. amend. XI.
22. See Bless Young & Kurt Gurka, An Overview of State Sovereign Immunity in the Federal
System, UTAH B.J., Oct. 2004, at 22, 22 (stating that the text of the Eleventh Amendment is
"easily understood as the constitutional overturning of [Chisholm]" but that it "offers little
assistance in determining the true scope of State sovereign immunity").
23. Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 429-50 (Iredell, J., dissenting).
24. Id. at 433-34 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 14, 1 Stat. 73
(codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. § 2241(a) (2000)).
25. Id. at 435.
26. Id. at 434-35.
27. See Lieb, supra note 20, at 216.
28. 134 U.S. 1 (1890).
29. Id. at 1.
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than adhering to a strictly textual interpretation of the Eleventh Amend-
ment, the Court ruled that States are immune from suits filed by citizens
of any State.3° It reasoned that state sovereign immunity was so widely
recognized at the time of ratification of the Constitution that it was
"hardly necessary to be formally asserted" in either the Constitution or
in the Eleventh Amendment.3"
To support its holding, the Court relied on, and quoted the state-
ments of, some of the Framers regarding state sovereign immunity at the
time of ratification.3 ' Looking specifically at language from Alexander
Hamilton, James Madison, and John Marshall, the Court concluded that
the Framers never thought it possible that a citizen could bring suit
against a State without its consent.33 In very clear words, the Court
stated that "[t]he suability of a state, without its consent, was a thing
unknown to the law."34 Writing for the majority, Justice Bradley also
found Justice Iredell's examination of sovereign immunity in his dissent
to Chisholm to be helpful.35 He even wrote that Justice Iredell "conclu-
sively showed" that subjecting sovereign States to suits by individuals
was "never done before."36 The Court's decision in Hans was the first
big step toward the contemporary conception of state sovereign
immunity.
C. Alden v. Maine
More than a century later, the Court faced another important ques-
tion regarding state sovereign immunity: Can Congress abrogate state
sovereign immunity in state courts? In Alden v. Maine, employees of
the State of Maine brought suit against the State in state court for viola-
tion of the Fair Labor Standards Act of 1938.3' The Court held that
Congress cannot subject non-consenting States to suit in their own
30. Id. at 20-21.
31. Id. at 15-16.
32. Id. at 12-14.
33. Id. The Supreme Court often relies heavily on Alexander Hamilton's Federalist No. 81
and No. 82 to support its views on the history of state sovereign immunity. See, e.g., Fed. Mar.
Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 752 (2002); Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706,
716-17 (1999); McKesson Corp. v. Div. of Alcoholic Beverages & Tobacco, 496 U.S. 18, 28 n. 10
(1990), Atascadero State Hosp. v. Scanlon, 473 U.S. 234, 275-76 (1985); Principality of Monaco
v. Mississippi, 292 U.S. 313, 322-23 (1934); Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 352,
418-20 (1821).
34. Hans, 134 U.S. at 16.
35. Id. at 12.
36. Id. Part III will show that this statement is not completely correct in light of historical
records.
37. 527 U.S. 706, 711-12 (1999). Petitioners originally filed suit in federal court, but it was
dismissed after the decision in Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
Petitioners then brought the same suit in state court. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712.
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courts under Article I of the U.S. Constitution.38 Reaffirming its ratio-
nale in Hans, the Court asserted that state sovereign immunity "neither
derives from nor is limited by the terms of the Eleventh Amendment."39
Instead of the Eleventh Amendment, the Court purported to rely on
"the Constitution's structure, and its history, and the authoritative inter-
pretations of [the Supreme Court]" to justify its decision.4" In fact, the
Court seemed to be asserting a somewhat novel idea: that state sovereign
immunity is somehow embodied in the Tenth Amendment.4' According
to this theory, the Tenth Amendment removed any doubt about the
States' immunity as sovereigns by reserving to the States any powers not
specifically delegated to the federal government or prohibited to the
States.42 Once again, the Eleventh Amendment was merely a way of
correcting the Court's misunderstanding in Chisholm. State sovereign
immunity existed before, and it existed after, the Amendment was
written.
D. Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina
State Ports Authority
In 2002, the Court finally made a somewhat surprising decision in
Federal Maritime Commission v. South Carolina State Ports Author-
ity.43 This case presented the question whether States are immune from
private suits in front of administrative agencies."4 The Court decided in
the affirmative, reasserting two major aspects of the state sovereign-
immunity doctrine: (1) state sovereign immunity existed before, and
continued after, ratification of the Constitution,45 and (2) state sovereign
immunity extends beyond the text of the Eleventh Amendment.46 The
Court based its holding, in part, on the "overwhelming" similarities
between the administrative proceedings in question and civil-judicial
proceedings, in which the Court previously held that States are immune
38. Alden, 527 U.S. at 712.
39. Id. at 713 ("We have . .. sometimes referred to the States' immunity from suit as
'Eleventh Amendment immunity.' The phrase is convenient shorthand but something of a
misnomer ....").
40. Id. The Court asserted that, at the time of ratification of the Constitution, the English
doctrine of state sovereign immunity was "universal" in the States. Id. at 715-16.
41. Id. at 713-14.
42. Id. ("Any doubt regarding the constitutional role of the States as sovereign entities is
removed by the Tenth Amendment, which ... was enacted to allay lingering concerns about the
extent of the national power."). This begs the question why the Eleventh Amendment was even
necessary. If the Tenth Amendment confirmed state sovereign immunity, why did Congress enact
another constitutional amendment?
43. 535 U.S. 743 (2002).
44. Id. at 747.
45. Id. at 751-52.
46. Id. at 753-54.
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from suit.47 Federal Maritime Commission left open the question
whether its holding would apply to administrative proceedings that are
significantly different from judicial proceedings.
Chisholm, Hans, Alden, and Federal Maritime Commission show
the historical progression of sovereign immunity in the United States,
from ratification through the present. It is evident that the Court
believes that state sovereign immunity transcends the Eleventh Amend-
ment and maybe even the Constitution itself. This framework guided
the Court in nearly all of its state sovereign-immunity decisions. And
this framework elucidates the inconsistencies of the Court's rationale in
Central Virginia Community College v. Katz.
III. THE DOCTRINE BECOMES MORE COMPLICATED
A. Seminole Tribe of Florida v. Florida
In 1996, the Supreme Court issued perhaps its most sweeping
endorsement of state sovereign immunity in Seminole Tribe of Florida v.
Florida.a" The question presented was relatively narrow: whether Con-
gress had validly abrogated state sovereign immunity under the Indian
Commerce Clause.4 9 At issue was the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act,
which governed Indian gaming activities." The Act, among other
things, allows gaming activities in states in which a valid compact exists
between the Indian tribe and the State.5" It mandates that States negoti-
ate with Indian tribes in good faith, and allows Indian tribes to bring suit
against a State if the State did not comply with the requirements of the
Act.
52
The Court determined that Congress clearly intended to abrogate
state sovereign immunity by passing the Indian Gaming Regulatory
Act.53 But the Court struck down the Act on the ground that Congress
did not have the constitutional power to unilaterally abrogate state sover-
eign immunity." It reached this conclusion based on a lengthy discus-
sion of the judicial history of state sovereign immunity.55 Once again,
47. Id. at 759.
48. 517 U.S. 44 (1996).
49. Id. at 47, 55. Contained in Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution, the Indian Commerce
Clause is part of the Commerce Clause, which gives Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes." U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 3.
50. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 47.
51. 25 U.S.C. § 2710(d)(1)(C) (1988), invalidated by Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517
U.S. 44 (1996).
52. § 2710(d)(7)(A).
53. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 56-57 (calling Congress's intent "indubitable").
54. Id. at 72.
55. Id. at 64-73.
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the Court stuck to its old adage: A textual interpretation of the Eleventh
Amendment does not describe the full scope of sovereign immunity
inherent in the Constitution.56
The way the Supreme Court invalidated the Indian Gaming Regula-
tory Act had a profound effect on state sovereign-immunity jurispru-
dence. Instead of simply ruling on congressional power to abrogate
under the Indian Commerce Clause, the Court unequivocally held that
Congress cannot abrogate state sovereign immunity under any of its
Article I powers.57 Chief Justice Rehnquist, writing for the majority,
stated that "[t]he Eleventh Amendment restricts the judicial power under
Article III, and Article I cannot be used to circumvent the constitutional
limitations placed upon federal jurisdiction. ' 58 The Court grouped all
Article I, Section 8 congressional powers together, implying that they
are all the same when it comes to state sovereign-immunity analysis.
The breadth of this statement shocked the dissenters. In a somewhat
prophetic moment, Justice Stevens pointed out that the Court's holding
"prevents Congress from providing a federal forum for a broad range of
actions against States, from those sounding in copyright and patent law,
to those concerning bankruptcy, environmental law, and the regulation
of our vast national economy. '59 The majority responded in footnote
sixteen that "it has not been widely thought that the federal antitrust,
bankruptcy, or copyright statutes abrogated the States' sovereign immu-
nity. This Court has never awarded relief against a State under any of
those statutory schemes . "..."60 As it turns out, this exchange caused a
great deal of confusion for courts applying the Seminole Tribe holding.
This was the high point for state sovereign immunity; for a few
years after Seminole Tribe, the States seemingly had almost unlimited
immunity from private suits.6 ' But the Court soon made an exception to
its clear-cut rule.
B. Hood: Bankruptcy Rears Its Ugly Head
After Seminole Tribe, it seemed as if there was very little Congress
could do to allow for private suits against States.62 In 2004, the first
56. Id. at 69-70.
57. Id. at 72-73. In making its ruling, the Court overturned its decision in Pennsylvania v.
Union Gas Co., 491 U.S. 1 (1989), which held that Congress had the power to abrogate state
sovereign immunity under the Interstate Commerce Clause. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66.
58. Id. at 72-73 (emphasis added).
59. Id. at 77 (Stevens, J., dissenting); see also Leonard H. Gerson, A Bankruptcy Exception to
Eleventh Amendment Immunity: Limiting the Seminole Tribe Doctrine, 74 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 3
(2000).
60. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 72 n.16.
61. See Lieb, supra note 20, at 218-19.
62. There were two avenues to bring suit against a State, but only in limited circumstances.
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sign of change came with the Court's ruling in Tennessee Student Assis-
tance Corp. v. Hood.63 There, a Chapter 7 debtor brought an action to
discharge a student loan that she owed to the Tennessee Student Assis-
tance Corporation, a state agency. 6
The Supreme Court granted certiorari to answer the question
whether Congress may abrogate state sovereign immunity under its Arti-
cle I bankruptcy power.65 It specifically focused on the constitutionality
of 11 U.S.C. § 106(a), a provision in the Bankruptcy Code that Congress
amended to make clear its intent to abrogate state sovereign immunity.66
But the Court never reached the important question it set out to answer.
It ruled that this particular action did not even implicate a State's sover-
eign immunity because the action focused on the res (the debtor's
estate), and not on the persona (the state).67 The Court reasoned that,
because of the in rem nature of this suit, it did not involve the affront to
state dignity that sovereign immunity was meant to prevent.68 The
Court pointed out that "States, whether or not they choose to participate
in the proceeding, are bound by a bankruptcy court's discharge order no
less than other creditors. 69 In essence, the Court held that the States are
no different from other creditors when it comes to bankruptcy proceed-
ings. This foreshadowed what was to come in Katz.
Important to the Hood decision was the fact that the plaintiff did
not seek monetary damages or affirmative relief from the State, only a
The Ex parte Young doctrine allows private suits against state officials seeking to enjoin ongoing
constitutional violations. 209 U.S. 123, 162 (1908). The Court also allows for suits under the
Fourteenth Amendment on the theory that the Amendment shifted the federal-state balance of
power in favor of the Congress. See Fitzpatrick v. Bitzer, 427 U.S. 445, 456 (1976).
63. 541 U.S. 440 (2004).
64. Id. at 443-44.
65. Id. at 443.
66. See 11 U.S.C. § 106(a) (2000) ("Notwithstanding an assertion of sovereign immunity,
sovereign immunity is abrogated as to a governmental unit to the extent set forth in this section
...."); see also Janet A. Flaccus, The Eleventh Amendment and Bankruptcy Jurisdiction over
States, 10 J. BANKR. L. & PRAC. 207, 207 (2001) ("Section 106 of the Bankruptcy Code was
amended to make it clear that Congress was waiving States' sovereign immunity from bankruptcy
suit ....").
67. Hood, 541 U.S. at 450 ("No matter how difficult Congress has decided to make the
discharge of student loan debt, the bankruptcy court's jurisdiction is premised on the res, not on
the persona ....").
68. Id. at 451; cf. Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 760 (2002)
("[I]f the Framers thought it an impermissible affront to a State's dignity to be required to answer
the complaints of private parties in federal courts, we cannot imagine that they would have found
it acceptable to compel a State to do exactly the same thing before the administrative tribunal of
an agency .... ). The Court partially relied on its decision in California v. Deep Sea Research,
Inc., 523 U.S. 491 (1998), to support its holding in this case. Hood, 541 at 446-47. In Deep Sea
Research, the Court held that the Eleventh Amendment did not bar a federal in rem admiralty suit
against a State where the State did not possess the res. 523 U.S. at 507-08.
69. Hood, 541 U.S. at 448.
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discharge of debts. 7' Although the Court does not explain its statement
on this issue, one can hypothesize that a suit seeking damages from a
State might involve an "affront to state dignity" and therefore merit a
different result.
The narrow decision in Hood allowed the Court to avoid contra-
dicting its decision in Seminole Tribe for a short time. But the important
questions left open after Hood did not stay unanswered for long.
C. The Katz Analysis Contradicts Seminole Tribe
In January 2006, in a 5-4 decision (with Justice O'Connor provid-
ing the swing vote), the Supreme Court set out to answer the heated
question left open after Hood: Does Congress have the power to abro-
gate state sovereign immunity under the Bankruptcy Clause?7" This suit
was initiated by a bankruptcy trustee to set aside preferential transfers to
state agencies.72 In a landmark decision, the Court held that Congress
does have the power to abrogate state sovereign immunity for actions
ancillary to in rem bankruptcy actions.73 Although recognizing that this
ruling directly contradicted its language in Seminole Tribe, the Court
made the decision anyway. 4 Just ten years after Seminole Tribe, the
Court seemed to be rethinking its framework for state sovereign
immunity.
The Court attempts to explain its change of heart through a detailed
evaluation of the history of bankruptcy and the Bankruptcy Clause. The
Katz opinion is replete with references to the Framers' intent and under-
standing.75 The majority attempted to distinguish the Bankruptcy
Clause from other Article I, Section 8 legislative powers-something
the Court had explicitly rejected in Seminole Tribe. Justice Thomas, in
his dissent, questioned this distinction.76 To him, "[n]othing in the text,
structure, or history of the Constitution indicates that the Bankruptcy
Clause, in contrast to all of the other provisions of Article I, manifests
70. Id. at 450.
71. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 540 U.S. 356, 361 (2006).
72. Id. at 359.
73. Id. at 372-73. "Under [the broad definition of 'ancillary'], virtually every proceeding
brought to implement or enforce a provision of the Bankruptcy Code ... would be 'ancillary' to
the in rem jurisdiction of the bankruptcy court." Lieb, supra note 20, at 231. Exactly what the
Court meant by "ancillary" is a question left unanswered in Katz.
74. Katz, 546 U.S. at 363 ("We acknowledge that statements in both the majority and
dissenting opinions in [Seminole Tribe] reflected an assumption that the holding in that case
would apply to the Bankruptcy Clause. Careful study and reflection have convinced us, however,
that that assumption was erroneous.") (citations omitted).
75. Id. at 369, 370, 373 (using phrases such as, "[b]ankruptcy jurisdiction, as understood
today and at the time of the framing," "[t]he Framers would have understood," and "the Framers'
primary goal was to prevent competing sovereigns' interference with the debtor's discharge").
76. Id. at 393 (Thomas, J., dissenting).
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the States' consent to be sued by private citizens. 77
In a relatively short opinion, the Court revealed a lot about its
understanding of state sovereign immunity and bankruptcy law. The
holding in Katz essentially depends on the Court's conclusion that the
Bankruptcy Clause was written into the Constitution with the under-
standing that it destroyed some immunity that the States enjoyed pre-
ratification.78  According to the majority, the Framers understood that
the States' divergent bankruptcy laws would cause huge problems, espe-
cially because debtors (at the time of ratification) were often impris-
oned. 79 The only way to create a uniform system of bankruptcy laws
was for the States to cede some of their immunity from suit. And the
States voluntarily did so upon ratification of the Constitution, which
included Congress's Article I bankruptcy power. Under this theory, the
States never had sovereign immunity from suits ancillary to in rem
bankruptcy actions.
IV. THE FOUNDATIONS OF STATE SOVEREIGN IMMUNITY:
WHAT DOEs HISTORY REALLY SAY?
A. The Fundamentals: English History
Most discussions of state sovereign immunity in the United States
begin with an examination of its historical roots. English law laid the
groundwork for early American sovereign-immunity doctrine.80 Com-
mon belief is that the King of England was absolutely immune from
private suit, as he was supreme over the judiciary.8' This belief, how-
ever, is not completely accurate.
In fact, the English crown was not entirely immune from suit.82 In
eighteenth century England, a procedure was available that allowed all
77. Id.
78. Id. at 373 (majority opinion) ("Insofar as orders ancillary to the bankruptcy courts' in rem
jurisdiction, like orders directing turnover of preferential transfers, implicate States' sovereign
immunity from suit, the States agreed in the plan of the Convention not to assert that immunity.").
79. Id. at 363; see also Brian Hermann & Penny Dearborn, Supreme Court 2006: The
Supremes Expand Bankruptcy Court Jurisdiction, AM. BANKR. INST. J., July-Aug. 2006, at 48, 49.
80. See Scott Dodson, The Metes and Bounds of State Sovereign Immunity, 29 HASTINGS
CONST. L.Q. 721, 727 (2002).
81. See id.
82. See Susan Randall, Sovereign Immunity and the Uses of History, 81 NEB. L. REV. 1, 29
(2002) ("Case law from at least a generation before publication of Blackstone's Commentaries
demonstrates that actions were prosecuted against the King without his consent."). For
discussions on misconstruction of English law and sovereign immunity, see James E. Pfander,
Sovereign Immunity and the Right To Petition: Toward a First Amendment Right To Pursue
Judicial Claims Against the Government, 91 Nw. U. L. REV. 899, 906-26 (1997). For further
discussion on the irrelevance of English law to the Framers' conception of sovereign immunity,
see Eric Berger, The Collision of the Takings and State Sovereign Immunity Doctrines, 63 WASH.
& LEE L. REV. 493, 544-45 (2006).
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subjects to pursue judicial remedies for government wrongdoings.83 The
procedure involved petitioning the Crown for permission to pursue an
action against the King.84 Over time, the Crown's consent to pursue
these actions became something of a formality.8 5 "Blackstone acknowl-
edged that the King had a constitutional duty to right wrongs and, fur-
ther, that the King must and always did so ... "86 He wrote:
[T]he law hath furnished the subject with a decent and respectful
mode of removing that invasion, by informing the king of the true
state of the matter in dispute: and, as it presumes that to know of an
injury and to redress it are inseparable in the royal breast, it then
issues as of course, in the king's own name, his orders to his judges
to justice to the party aggrieved.87
Blackstone's own writings, while proclaiming that the King can do no
wrong, also show that sovereign immunity was not absolute.88
One of the central arguments for implicit sovereign immunity
within the structure of the Constitution is the idea that absolute sover-
eign immunity, stemming from English law, existed before ratification.
In Alden v. Maine, Justice Kennedy wrote, "[w]hen the Constitution was
ratified, it was well established in English law that the Crown could not
be sued without consent in its own courts."89 Yet accounts of English
history do not show this to be an unequivocal truth.
B. Sovereign Immunity and the Constitution: History and Text
Because English history of sovereign immunity remains unclear, it
is necessary to turn to American history. Although most scholars agree
that some form of sovereign immunity existed for the thirteen original
states, not all agree that it was immutable. 90 While the Framers certainly
discussed the suability of the States in connection with Article III, there
was no specific state sovereign-immunity discussion at the Constitu-
tional Convention. 91 And the Framers failed to even mention state sov-
ereign immunity in the text of the Constitution. This makes it difficult
83. See Pfander, supra note 82, at 906-08.
84. Id.; see also Chisholm v. Georgia, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 419, 442 (1793).
85. See Pfander, supra note 82, at 921-26; Randall, supra note 82, at 28-29. Justice Wilson
recognized the English practice of petitions in Chisholm: "True it is, that now in England the King
must be sued in his Courts by Petition; but even now, the difference is only in the form, not in the
thing." Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 460 (Wilson, J., concurring).
86. Randall, supra note 82, at 28-29.
87. Pfander, supra note 82, at 901 n.6 (emphasis omitted) (quoting WILLIAM BLACKSTONE,
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND *254-55 (St. George Tucker ed., 1803)).
88. See Pfander, supra note 82, at 926; Randall, supra note 82, at 28-29.
89. Alden v. Maine, 527 U.S. 706, 715 (1999) (citing Chisholm, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) at 437-46).
90. See Gregory C. Sisk, A Primer on the Doctrine of Federal Sovereign Immunity, 58 OKLA.
L. REV. 439, 443-44 (2005).
91. Erwin Chemerinsky, Against Sovereign Immunity, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1201, 1206 (2001).
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to determine what, if anything, the Constitution and the Eleventh
Amendment actually did to the immunity that existed before ratification.
Ratification of the Constitution necessarily involved some relin-
quishment of power by the States. And the States understood this was
necessary to form a working union. The Articles of Confederation had
not created a strong enough federal power, so some things had to
change.92
There were four primary tasks involved in the Constitutional Con-
vention: "creating a strong but limited central government, protecting
individual rights against the states, dividing power within the central
government, and dividing power between local and central officials. 93
The Constitution therefore created a framework in which the States
retained some powers but also gave up many others.
In Alden v. Maine, Justice Kennedy relied on Federalist No. 81,
written by Alexander Hamilton, to support his conclusion that state sov-
ereign immunity existed before ratification and that the States retained
their immunity implicitly under the Constitution.94 Federalist 81 states:
It is inherent in the nature of sovereignty, not to be amenable to the
suit of an individual without its consent. This is the general sense and
the general practice of mankind; and the exemption, as one of the
attributes of sovereignty, is now enjoyed by the government of every
state in the union. Unless therefore, there is a surrender of this
immunity in the plan of the convention, it will remain with the states,
and the danger intimated must be merely ideal.95
This statement is telling of the intentions of at least one very influential
framer, and others probably shared the sentiment. Despite the strong
language, however, it does not provide as much insight as it seems to at
first glance. First, there is a surrender of state sovereignty in-the plan of
the Convention. In creating a federalist system from one where States
were the primary sovereigns, there must be some surrender of control.
On the other hand, there is no specific mention of sovereign immunity in
the Constitution. While the Constitution divides up power between the
federal and state governments and between the three branches of federal
government, it requires a study of historical records and some educated
Most of the discussion at the Convention regarding suits against States concerned States' fears
about being judicially required to pay substantial Revolutionary War debts. Id. at 1206-07.
92. Akhil Reed Amar, Of Sovereignty and Federalism, 96 YALE L.J. 1425, 1448-49 (1987).
93. Id. at 1439.
94. Alden, 527 U.S. 706, 716-17 (1999). In describing the history of state sovereign
immunity in the United States, Justice Kennedy wrote, "[T]he doctrine that a sovereign could not
be sued without its consent was universal in the States when the Constitution was drafted and
ratified." Id. at 715-16.
95. THE FEDERALIST No. 81, at 397 (Alexander Hamilton) (Terence Ball ed., 2003).
2007]
UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI LAW REVIEW
guessing to determine how, if at all, the Constitution affected the
state-federal balance of power.
Article I of the Constitution governs the legislative branch of the
federal government. Section 8 lays out the scope of legislative power in
a very particular way. After all, the federal government was supposed to
be made up of specific enumerated powers, with everything else
reserved to the States and to the people. Article I, Section 8 powers
include the power to regulate commerce between the States, the power
to establish uniform bankruptcy laws, the power to coin money, and the
power to collect taxes.96 These powers are listed in no discernable order
and are not distinguished from each other in any way. Section 9 sets
limitations on congressional power. 97 But Section 9 does not state that
state sovereign immunity limits Congress's exercise of its Section 8
powers. Moreover, Article I does not describe the state of sovereign
immunity and provides no clear clues to the Framers' intent.
Article III of the Constitution frames the federal judicial power.
Section 2 delineates the scope of that power. Two important clauses in
this section give some hints about the Framers' intention for the role of
the judiciary: (1) "The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law
and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United
States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Author-
ity," and (2) it shall extend "to Controversies . . .between a State and
Citizens of another State." 98 In the first clause, the Framers spoke in
terms of cases and controversies, not in terms of the parties involved.
The Supreme Court and the inferior federal courts that Congress chose
to establish decide all cases that arise under the Constitution and the
laws of the United States. Again, there is no mention of state sovereign
immunity limiting this jurisdiction.
In the second clause-the diversity clause-the Framers did focus
on the parties involved. They specifically extended federal judicial
power to cases between one State and citizens of another state. The
inclusion of this phrase is perplexing. These types of controversies are
already included in the federal courts' jurisdiction under the first clause
if they arise under the Constitution or federal laws. The Framers seem-
ingly wanted to broaden the scope of federal jurisdiction specifically for
cases where a state was a party.
Although there seems to have been little or no discussion about the
diversity clause during the Convention,99 it was a matter of discussion at
96. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cis. 1, 3-5.
97. Id. at art. I, § 9.
98. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.
99. See William A. Fletcher, A Historical Interpretation of the Eleventh Amendment: A
[Vol. 62:157
SEMINOLE TRIBE IN THE POST-KATZ ERA
the various state ratification debates." ° The Framers were aware that
one of the implications of this clause was the possibility that States
would be exposed to lawsuits in federal court. Edmund Randolph, a key
drafter of Article III, "defended the clause on the twin assumptions that
the state could be either a plaintiff or a defendant and that the clause
would indeed subject the states to liability."101 George Mason and Pat-
rick Henry, both of whom opposed ratification of the Constitution,
addressed the concern that the diversity clause of Article III exposed
States to liability in federal court.' °2 George Mason wrote:
Claims respecting those lands, every liquidated account, or other
claim against this state, will be tried before the federal court. Is this
not disgraceful? Is this state to be brought to the bar of justice like a
delinquent individual? Is the sovereignty of the state to be arraigned
like a culprit, or private offender? t0 3
Some of the Framers believed that the diversity clause in Article III did
not pose a threat to state sovereign immunity.0 4 Both Alexander Hamil-
ton and James Madison thought States could not be sued in federal court
without their consent, despite the language in the clause."0 5
Notwithstanding the debate over the diversity clause and the lack of
clarity in its language, the Framers chose to include it without any refer-
ence to implications for state sovereign immunity. So, they either
intended to abrogate sovereign immunity despite the reservations of
some States, or they thought that sovereign immunity so clearly survived
the diversity clause that there was no need to include anything in the
text. One thing is certain: The surrender of immunity or lack thereof
was anything but clear in the plan of the Convention.
Immediately following the Supreme Court's decision in Chisholm,
the country ratified the Eleventh Amendment. The language of this
Amendment expressly rejects the language of the diversity clause in
Article III. The Eleventh Amendment expresses the idea that Americans
considered repugnant to the Constitution the idea that a citizen should be
Narrow Construction of an Affirmative Grant of Jurisdiction Rather Than a Prohibition Against
Jurisdiction, 35 STAN. L. REV. 1033, 1046 (1983). The clause was a "marginal note to a draft of
Article III" and was adopted with very little editing. Id. at 1045-46.
100. See Chemerinsky, supra note 91, at 1206-08.
101. Fletcher, supra note 99, at 1050. Some people, Edmund Randolph among them, felt that
abrogation of state sovereign immunity was an appropriate means of holding States accountable
for their wrongs. See Chemerinsky, supra note 91, at 1207-08. Randolph asked, "Are we to say
that we shall discard this government because it would make us all honest?" Id. (citation omitted).
102. See Chemerinsky, supra note 91, at 1207
103. Id. (quoting 3 THE DEBATES IN THE SEVERAL STATE CONVENTIONS ON THE ADOPTION OF
THE FEDERAL CONSTITUTION 526-27 (Jonathan Elliot ed., 1937).
104. Id. at 1208-09.
105. Id. at 1208.
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allowed to sue a State without its consent. However, it is worded quite
narrowly and does not communicate the full scope of state sovereign
immunity as the Supreme Court sees it.
Nonetheless, the fact remains that the language of the Constitution
contemplates suits against States. In a 'relatively short document in
which each word is assigned special significance, the Framers chose to
include the words of the diversity clause, and chose not to include any-
thing about state sovereign immunity.
V. Is BANKRUPTCY REALLY DIFFERENT?
The history of state sovereign immunity and its place within the
Constitutional structure is far from clear. It is therefore easy to see why
courts have had a difficult time articulating a consistent state sovereign-
immunity doctrine. But the Supreme Court's decisions in Seminole
Tribe and Katz are so incompatible that it is hard to see how both can
stand at once.
In Seminole Tribe, the Court unequivocally stated that Congress
may never abrogate state sovereign immunity under any of its Article I,
Section 8 powers.1"6 In Katz, the Court then declined to follow Semi-
nole Tribe, calling statements in it that led to the assumption that its
holding applied to the Bankruptcy Clause, "dicta." 107 The Court's hold-
ing reflects the belief that the Bankruptcy Clause somehow differs from
the other Article I legislative powers, specifically the Commerce Clause
and the Indian Commerce Clause. What makes this holding interesting
is that the Court insinuates that (1) state sovereign immunity existed at
the time of ratification (and is implicitly contained in the Constitution),
and (2) the Framers intended Article I legislative powers each to be
treated differently with respect to state sovereign immunity.
The following sections will discuss the history of the Bankruptcy
Clause and compare it with the history of the Patent Clause to determine
if the Court was right in Katz. In Katz and in Florida Prepaid, the Court
treats the Patent Clause and the Bankruptcy Clause differently with
respect to state sovereign immunity even though both are legislative
powers enumerated in Article I, Section 8. If it is true that these two
clauses are different, then Seminole Tribe is essentially destroyed and
courts must now evaluate each legislative power separately as regards
state sovereign immunity. This further complicates the messy doctrine.
106. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996).
107. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 362, 363 (2006).
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A. History of Bankruptcy Law
There was no uniform bankruptcy law at the time of this country's
founding. Each State had its own variations on the laws. One of the
common themes of state bankruptcy law, however, was the debtor's
prison. "[E]very colony, and later every state," allowed for imprison-
ment of debtors.1"8 Debtors who were imprisoned were subjected to
inhuman conditions and indeterminate sentences." °9 There were two
major problems with this system of imprisoning debtors: (1) it did not
help the debtor repay his debts; and (2) even if a debtor paid off his
debts in one state, he might still be subject to imprisonment in another
state.110 As with interstate commerce, the Framers understood that
inconsistent bankruptcy laws would inhibit their goal of creating a
united nation of states.ill
The Court recognized these problems in Katz. "Foremost on the
minds of those who adopted the Clause were the intractable problems,
not to mention the injustice, created by one State's imprisoning of debt-
ors who had been discharged (from prison and of their debts) in and by
another State."' 12 According to the Court, the Framers' concern over
uniformity prompted the inclusion of the Bankruptcy Clause in the Con-
stitution." 3 And, through the Bankruptcy Clause, the Framers author-
ized Congress to establish a system of bankruptcy laws and a federal
judicial process that would bind debtors and creditors to a comprehen-
sive scheme." 4 It was hoped that this would resolve the problems with
debtor's prisons and allow for greater debt repayment.
The first federal bankruptcy act was passed in 1800.115 This act
shifted the balance of power from the States to the federal government.
It authorized federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus to state offi-
108. Randolph J. Haines, The Uniformity Power: Why Bankruptcy Is Different, 77 AM. BANKR.
L.J. 129, 154 (2003) (quoting BRUCE MANN, REPUBLIC OF DEBTORS: BANKRUPTCY IN THE AGE OF
AMERICAN INDEPENDENCE 182-83 (2002) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
109. Id.
110. Id. at 155; see also Ralph Brubaker, From Fictionalism to Functionalism in State
Sovereign Immunity: The Bankruptcy Discharge as Statutory Ex Parte Young Relief After Hood,
13 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 59, 86 (2005) ("ITjhere were apparently no decisions treating a
state court discharge as an in rem decree binding upon all of the debtor's creditors irrespective of
their state of residence.") (emphasis in original).
111. See Haines, supra note 108, at 157 (proposing that debtor's prisons caused the Framers to
consider expanding the Full Faith and Credit clause so that each state would have to recognize its
sister states' bankruptcy rulings).
112. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363 (2006); see also Hermann & Dearborn,
supra note 79, at 49.
113. Katz, 546 U.S. at 362; see also Haines, supra note 108, at 157.
114. See Brubaker, supra note 110, at 69.
115. Anthony J. Enright, Note, The Originalist's Dilemma: Katz and the New Approach to the
State Sovereign Immunity Defense, 81 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1553, 1558 (2006).
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cials to prompt the release of state bankruptcy prisoners.1 16 However,
the first bankruptcy act was narrow and temporary. It provided only
limited relief for debtors, was only available to merchants and traders,
and was largely a pro-creditor remedy. 1 7 It was not until 1867 that
Congress passed an expansive and permanent federal bankruptcy act. 118
The Bankruptcy Clause and the first bankruptcy act were necessary
to achieve the Framers' goal of a uniform system of bankruptcy laws.
These measures, however, required the States to give up sovereign con-
trol over bankruptcy actions. This worried some Framers, who thought
that the States had already given up so much. As one commentator put
it, the Constitutional Convention was "a Convention whose delegates
had already exceeded the authority the states had vested in them, which
was merely to consider revisions to the Articles of Confederation."'1 19
Did the States also agree to cede their sovereign immunity for the sake
of uniform bankruptcy laws? The Katz Court believed that they did.
B. Focus on "Uniform"
The Bankruptcy Clause, located in Article I, Section 8 of the Con-
stitution gives Congress the power "[t]o establish ... uniform Laws on
the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States."12 Much of
the discussion about bankruptcy's special status focuses on the word
"uniform." The only other Article I, Section 8 power to contain the
word "uniform" is the Naturalization Clause, which is structurally con-
nected to the Bankruptcy Clause. 12 Even the Commerce Clause, which
was written specifically to allow Congress to uniformly control inter-
state commerce, does not actually contain the word "uniform.' 22
Scholars have attempted to distinguish the Bankruptcy Clause from
other Section 8 powers based on the word "uniform."' 123 The uniformity
116. See Adam J. Levitin, Toward a Federal Common Law of Bankruptcy: Judicial
Lawmaking in a Statutory Regime, 80 AM. BANKR. L.J. 1, 72 (2006).
117. Randolph J. Haines, Getting to Abrogation, 75 AM. BANKR. L.J. 447, 457-58 (2001).
118. Id. at 461-62.
119. See Haines, supra note 108, at 157. Although this commentator recognizes that the
Framers probably did not even have the authority to abrogate state sovereign immunity as to
bankruptcy [or anything else, for that matter], he believes that the abrogation was minor compared
to all of the other powers states were transferring to the federal government under the
Constitution. See id.
120. U.S. CoNsT. art. I, § 8, cl. 4.
121. Id. (granting Congress the power "[t]o establish an uniform Rule of Naturalization").
122. Id. art. I, § 8, cl. 3. (granting Congress the power "[t]o regulate Commerce with foreign
Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes").
123. See Haines, supra note 108, at 158-59 (asserting that a certain interpretation of the
uniformity language in the bankruptcy clause provides the strongest argument for that clause
being different from the other Article I, section 8 powers); see also Gerson, supra note 59, at 11.
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provision makes bankruptcy a "uniquely federal interest."' 24 However,
whether the Framers meant for bankruptcy to be super-uniform, meaning
the same across state lines and the same for every creditor, is
ambiguous. 125
There is an alternative and logical reason for the Framers' inclusion
of the word "uniform" in the Bankruptcy Clause. The Framers may
have intended there to be geographic uniformity in bankruptcy laws.
12 6
After looking at the issues that prompted inclusion of the Bankruptcy
Clause in the Constitution, this interpretation seems highly plausible.
The chief problem with bankruptcy before ratification was that debts
discharged in one state were not always discharged in every state. Uni-
form federal bankruptcy laws would solve this problem. Members of
the Supreme Court have validated this interpretation on at least one
occasion, stating that the uniformity requirement "is wholly satisfied
when existing obligations of a debtor are treated alike by the bankruptcy
administration throughout the country regardless of the State in which
the bankruptcy court sits."'2 7
Moreover, simply because the States ceded virtually all control
over bankruptcy lawmaking to the federal government does not mean
that they also ceded their sovereign immunity. The argument that the
States ceded their sovereign immunity is nearly identical to Justice Bren-
nan's argument in Pennsylvania v. Union Gas Co.'28 In Union Gas,
Justice Brennan held that Congress could abrogate state sovereign
immunity under the Interstate Commerce Clause. 29 He reasoned that
the States, in giving Congress plenary power to regulate interstate com-
merce, ceded their sovereign immunity. 3 ' The Seminole Tribe Court
later overruled Union Gas holding that Congress could not abrogate
state sovereign immunity under any of the Article I powers.13 1  In
essence, the Court determined that the States did not automatically cede
their immunity when they gave Congress the power to regulate the areas
listed in Article I, Section 8. The Court's broad holding did not attempt
to distinguish any particular congressional power.
Although the Bankruptcy Clause is textually different from the
124. Levitin, supra note 116, at 71 (quoting Bank of Main v. England, 385 U.S. 99, 103
(1966) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
125. Courts seem to have interpreted the Bankruptcy Clause as requiring an extreme (or super)
level of uniformity as compared to the other Article I, Section 8 powers.
126. See Haines, supra note 108, at 158.
127. Vanston Bondholders Protective Comm. v. Green, 329 U.S. 156, 172 (1946) (Frankfurter,
J., concurring).
128. 491 U.S. 1 (1989).
129. Id. at 23.
130. Id. at 14.
131. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 72-73 (1996).
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other Article I, Section 8 clauses because of its use of the word "uni-
form," there is insufficient evidence to suggest that the Framers intended
"uniform" to mean anything more than geographic uniformity. History
suggests that the Framers included the Bankruptcy Clause in the Consti-
tution to try to remedy the lack of uniformity. Super-uniformity in
bankruptcy proceedings tended to make settlements easier and fairer,
and prevented States from using their sovereign immunity to gain an
unfair advantage over other creditors. 3 2 History, however, shows that
this was not the main purpose behind the Bankruptcy Clause.
The Katz Court attempted to prove the super-uniformity theory
through the grant of habeas power in the first bankruptcy act.13 3 But the
power of federal courts to issue writs of habeas corpus to States does not
lead to the conclusion that States ceded their sovereign immunity in
bankruptcy suits. The habeas power clearly flows from the need for
uniformity in bankruptcy administration; opening up States to private
suits, however, does not.
C. Comparing the Bankruptcy Clause to the Patent Clause
Because no Article I power is overtly distinct from another, it is
important to compare the histories and uses of the powers. The Patent
Clause, for example, provides an especially relevant comparison to the
Bankruptcy Clause, as evidenced in the Court's recent decision in Flor-
ida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board v. College Sav-
ings Bank.
134
In Florida Prepaid, the Court addressed the constitutional validity
of the Patent Remedy Act. 35 That Act specifically abrogated state sov-
ereign immunity in patent-infringement actions, defining "whoever" as
including "any State, any instrumentality of a State, and any officer or
employee of a State or instrumentality of a State acting in his official
capacity." '136 The Court struck down the Patent Remedy Act' 37 and reit-
erated the holding in Seminole Tribe that Congress may not abrogate
state sovereign immunity pursuant to any of its Article I powers.
138
The U.S. patent system derived from the English system. 39 The
132. See Gerson, supra note 59, at 9.
133. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 375 (2006).
134. 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
135. Id. at 631.
136. 35 U.S.C. § 27 1(h) (1994), invalidated by Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd.
v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627 (1999).
137. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 630.
138. Id. at 636.
139. See Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress to Useful Arts: American Patent
Law and Administration, 1787-1836 (Part I), 79 J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. Soc'y, 61, 68
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colonies adopted the English practices. 4 ° Now, however, U.S. patent
law "consists of domestic precedents that are essentially free-stand-
ing."' 41 Before the Constitution, the American intellectual-property sys-
tem consisted of various state laws that did not always coincide with one
another. 142 There was a similar lack-of-uniformity problem in this sys-
tem as there was in the bankruptcy system.
Despite this need for uniformity in intellectual property, the Patent
Clause did not garner much attention at the Constitutional Conven-
tion.143 This does not mean that the States did not have concerns about
intellectual-property rights. There was a need to protect these rights in
order "to encourage socially beneficial innovation." 1"
Although intellectual-property rights did not occupy a great deal of
time among Constitutional Convention delegates, the Patent Clause was
included as one of the few enumerated legislative powers in the Consti-
tution, indicating its importance. The clause gives Congress the power
"[t]o promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for
limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their
respective Writings and Discoveries." 145 The economy and develop-
ment of the country depended on promoting innovation and technol-
ogy.' 46 In describing the Patent Clause, Justice Story wrote:
It is beneficial to all parties, that the national government should pos-
sess this power; to authors and inventors, because, otherwise, they
would be subjected to the varying laws and systems of the different
states on this subject, which would impair, and might even destroy
the value of their rights; to the public, as it will promote the progress
of science and the useful arts, and admit the people at large, after a
short interval, to the full possession and enjoyment of all writings and
inventions without restraint. 1
47
There are actually two different theories on the purpose behind the
(1997); see also 1 R. CARL MOY, MOY'S WALKER ON PATENTS § 1:6, at 1-20 (4th ed. 2006). The
major English statute on patents was the State of Monopolies of 1623. Id.
140. See Walterscheid, supra note 137, at 68.
141. Moy, supra note 137, § 1:2, at 1-8.
142. Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress. of Science and Useful Arts: The
Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of the United States Constitution, 2 J.
INTELL. PROP. L. 1, 22 (1994).
143. Id. at 24-26. No state instructed its delegates to seek a copyright law in the Constitution.
Id. at 24.
144. Id. at 27 n.89 (quoting Morgan Sherwood, The Origins and Development of the American
Patent System, 71 AM. Sci. 500, 500 (1983)).
145. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8.
146. See Moy, supra note 137, § 1:5, at 1-18 (indicating that patents for new inventors were
good for the country's economy); see also Walterscheid, supra note 140, at 34 (describing an
economic reason for the implementation of the Patent Clause).
147. Joseph Story, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES § 558, at
402-03 (Boston, Hilliard, Gray, & Co. 1833).
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Patent Clause: (1) "to provide fundamental justice to the inventor," and
(2) to provide "a useful means for the State to encourage invention."' 48
The text of the clause and the historical evidence seem to indicate that
the second theory was the central purpose of the Clause; however, it
would be difficult to encourage invention and "promote the progress of
science and the useful arts" without ensuring inventors and authors that
their works would be protected. Innovation is, after all, an expensive
venture that usually requires large investments of time and money. Any
meaningful guarantee of protection for inventors involves protection
from any infringement, even state infringement. Despite the clear need
for super-uniformity under the Patent Clause, the Court has ruled that
Congress does not have the power to abrogate state immunity under that
Clause. 149
The Bankruptcy and Patent Clauses share the common purpose of
creating a uniform federal system of laws. The States suffered from a
lack of uniformity in both areas before ratification. In bankruptcy law,
the problem was the States' lack of respect for other States' bankruptcy
judgments. In patent law, there was an economic need for a common,
federal recognition of inventors' property rights. The States gave up
portions of their sovereignty to make both of these federal systems work.
But it does not seem that the States gave up more sovereignty in bank-
ruptcy than they did in intellectual property.
D. The Court's Dicta Argument: An Exercise in Semantics
Comparing the Bankruptcy Clause with the Patent Clause shows
the unlikelihood that the Framers intended to treat state sovereign immu-
nity differently as to each Article I power. The Court drew this conclu-
sion in Seminole Tribe. But in Katz, the Court insisted that the
Bankruptcy Clause is somehow different. It seems only logical that the
Court would overturn Seminole Tribe, at least with respect to its bold
statement about Article I powers. Nonetheless, the Court avoided hav-
ing to do this through a tricky mincing of words-it called its broad
Seminole Tribe rule "dicta" and declined to follow it.150
The Court's assertion in Katz that the language in Seminole Tribe
about Article I and state sovereign immunity was mere dicta is difficult
to believe. The Court reaffirmed its statement about Article I powers on
a number of occasions. 5 ' In College Savings Bank v. Florida Prepaid
148. Moy, supra note 137, § 1:12, at 1-30.
149. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd. v. Coll. Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. 627, 636
(1999).
150. Cent. Va. Cmty. Coll. v. Katz, 546 U.S. 356, 363 (2006).
151. See, e.g., Fed. Mar. Comm'n v. S.C. State Ports Auth., 535 U.S. 743, 749-50 (2002);
[Vol. 62:157
SEMINOLE TRIBE IN THE POST-KATZ ERA
Postsecondary Education Expense Board, the Court referred to the lan-
guage in Seminole Tribe as its "antiabrogation holding."'1 2 In the com-
panion case, Florida Prepaid Postsecondary Education Expense Board.
v. College Savings Bank, the Court boldly stated, "Seminole Tribe makes
clear that Congress may not abrogate state sovereign immunity pursuant
to its Article I powers." '53 These opinions were handed down just three
years after the same Court's decision in Seminole Tribe. The Justices
fully understood the holding in Seminole Tribe because they wrote and
signed on to it.
Within the Seminole Tribe opinion itself, the majority discussed the
difference between obiter dicta and binding precedent in response to the
dissent's accusation of attending to dicta.154 In defending its "well-
established rationale," the majority asserted that both the results of its
own opinions bind it and "those portions of the opinion necessary to that
result." 
155
The majority's statement that Congress could never abrogate state
sovereign immunity under one of its Article I powers is necessary to
reach the specific result in Seminole Tribe. The Court used a two-part
test in deciding whether the Indian Gaming Regulatory Act was a valid
abrogation of state sovereign immunity: (1) Has Congress "unequivo-
cally expressed its intent" to abrogate state sovereign immunity?; and (2)
Has Congress acted "pursuant to a valid exercise" of congressional
power?1 56 Both questions had to be answered in the affirmative for the
Act to pass constitutional scrutiny. The Court found it "unmistakably
clear" and "indubitable" that Congress intended to abrogate state sover-
eign immunity under the Act. 157 However, it denied jurisdiction to hear
the case because the Act did not pass the second prong of the test-
Congress did not act pursuant to a valid congressional power.1 58 The
Court had a chance, but chose not to do a clause-by-clause analysis of
Coll. Sav. Bank v. Fla. Prepaid Postsecondary Educ. Expense Bd., 527 U.S. 666, 683 (1999); Fla.
Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 636.
152. CoIl Sav. Bank, 527 U.S. at 683.
153. Fla. Prepaid, 527 U.S. at 636.
154. Seminole Tribe of Fla. v. Florida, 517 U.S. 44, 66-67 (1996) ("Contending that our
decision is a novel extension of the Eleventh Amendment, the dissent chides us for 'attend[ing]' to
dicta. We adhere in this case, however, not to mere obiter dicta, but rather to the well-established
rationale upon which the Court based the results of its earlier decisions. When an opinion issues
for the Court, it is not only the result but also those portions of the opinion necessary to that result
by which we are bound.").
155. Id.
156. Id. at 55 (quoting Green v. Mansour, 474 U.S. 64, 68 (1985)).
157. Id. at 56-57 (internal quotation marks omitted).
158. The petitioner argued for an alternative basis for jurisdiction under the doctrine of Ex
parte Young, but was again denied. Id. at 75-76. However, this argument never would have been
necessary if the Court found the abrogation to be constitutional.
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the connection between each Article I power and state sovereign immu-
nity.15 9 Instead, the Court swiftly overturned Pennsylvania v. Union
Gas Co. and made a sweeping "antiabrogation" statement about all Arti-
cle I powers. 16' The outcome of the case depended on that statement; it
may have been overly broad, but it certainly was not dictum.
VI. CONCLUSION
State sovereign-immunity jurisprudence is a tricky area of law that
the Supreme Court attempted to simplify through Seminole Tribe. But
that simplicity did not last long. The Court's puzzling decision in Katz
opened up the door to a complete reworking of the state sovereign-
immunity doctrine-one that requires careful examination of each sepa-
rate Article I, Section 8 power. If the Bankruptcy Clause is somehow
different, what about the Tax Clause or the Naturalization Clause? The
Seminole Tribe holding would have to be overturned under this kind of
doctrine. Katz destroys the idea that Congress can never abrogate state
sovereign immunity under any of the Article I powers. No amount of
explaining can combine Seminole Tribe and Katz into a coherent
doctrine.
As this Article shows, the Court's rationale in Katz is highly ques-
tionable. The Bankruptcy Clause is really not that different from the
Patent Clause or the other Article I, Section 8 powers. Each power
involves the States' relinquishment of some sovereignty in order to
allow for uniform systems of law. But none specifically mentions state
sovereign immunity. This is because a uniform system of federal laws
does not require States to give up their sovereign immunity; it can be
accomplished with less of a sacrifice.
If the Court refuses to overrule Seminole Tribe, then it must over-
rule Katz. Both holdings cannot stand simultaneously. The holding in
Hood, the precursor to Katz, can be reconciled with Seminole Tribe
because a typical bankruptcy suit is focused on the res, not the specific
creditors. But an ancillary suit against the State, itself, is different. It
involves an affront to state dignity that sovereign immunity was meant
to avoid. History does not conclusively show that States intended to
abrogate their sovereign immunity with respect to suits like this.
Seminole Tribe and Katz are on two completely different ends of
the doctrinal spectrum. The Court will have to choose. And when it
does, it will have some explaining to do.
159. See Dodson, supra note 80, at 744-45.
160. Seminole Tribe, 517 U.S. at 66.
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